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1 Introduction 
Alan Westin describes privacy as follows: "...individuals, groups or institutions have 
the right to control, edit, manage and delete information about themselves and to 
decide when, how and to what extent that information is communicated to others" 
(Westin 1967). Although Westin has a broad view compared to modern standards, 
the basic value of privacy still holds. Privacy should be considered as a right and not 
as a privilege. The people requiring privacy are usually labeled as persons who want 
to hide something - radicals, criminals, terrorists, even though they have done 
nothing wrong and just want to uphold their civil rights. 
People who discard the need for privacy usually use the excuse "But I have nothing 
to hide". However, this is not ultimately true, as every person has something they do 
not wish to publish about themselves. People make judgemental calls all the time 
about what they tell about ourselves to others and in what way. They have opinions 
and views they do not want to air to everyone, they have secrets and have the right 
to control who they share the information with. The loss of privacy by the means of 
surveillance prevents the normal transfer of this information to the parties that have 
been deemed worthy of it unless it is also presented to the surveilling party. The 
surveillance does not even need to be present as the mere knowledge of being 
watched over is enough. This will essentially make people shut up and keep the 
information to themselves more easily and the knowledge or illusion of being 
watched will affect their social behaviour as well. The phenomena is explained in a 
Ted Talk by reporter Glenn Greenwald (Greenwald 2014), who explains the reasons 
why people want to have private moments and why large-scale monitoring may 
affect them more than is understood. 
The goal of this thesis was to explain the reasons behind internet surveillance and 
user tracking, find out the most common methods of how it is done and implement 
these in the JYVSECTEC Realistic Global Cyber Environment (RGCE) in a way that they 
can be further used for demonstrations and training exercises. 
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2 Research questions  
2.1 Research objectives 
The idea to this thesis is based on the writer’s own interest to find out how individual 
persons are being tracked and monitored on the modern internet. Applying this 
information to JYVSECTEC Realistic Global Cyber Environment (RGCE) will allow the 
use of realistic cases for training and demo purposes. As it was quickly found out, 
documenting everything from the privacy point of view for tracking and monitoring 
became much too large a task for this thesis; hence the following main objectives 
were selected for the implementation and documentation: 
 What are the motives behind tracking? 
 What are the general methods of implementing user tracking on internet and how 
they work? 
 How can these methods be implemented and used in the RGCE? 
 What can the user do to evade these methods and how effective evasion is? 
2.2 Research methods 
As the subject is highly technical and relies heavily on technical implementation, 
qualitative research methods were selected for thesis. Research starts with 
documenting the different methods of web-based tracking and data collection. On 
the side, methods used in the operating system or network-level are also gathered. 
Most of this work is done with the help of the internet since there is no collective 
documentation elsewhere on how this is done. 
Next, a set of evasion methods commonly used for the sake of maintaining privacy 
and removing or blocking tracking elements from web are selected for further study. 
These will probably be mostly web browser plugins based on whitelists, so an 
interest is taken on how these methods will cope in RGCE where the implementation 
differs somewhat from a real-world scenario. 
Tracking methods are then implemented in the RGCE using readily available 
applications or code snippets as the author is no a programmer. Most of the 
methods are meant to be inserted into web pages so a subset of pages in RGCE is 
selected for testing. 
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Then, the different tracking methods are tested with the selected set of browsers 
and plugins, evaluating how easy or hard it is for the user to avoid them. The results 
will show how efficient different methods are in establishing an identity for the 
tracked user, and also how easy these methods are to implement in different sites. 
From the user's perspective it will be conducted what are the most efficient tools for 
avoiding these types of tracking methods and how easy or hard they are to use. 
3 Privacy issues 
3.1 Privacy and Security 
Security and privacy are usually considered to coexist. Locking one’s house makes 
one feel both secure and private, however, this is not necessarily true when using the 
Internet. Being secure in IT means one cannot be attacked with a malicious intent, 
and this may give the user the false feeling of being private, even though he/she can 
still be tracked in many ways not considered malicious by security vendors. Anti-
viruses, firewalls, malware scanners and such do nothing for privacy, except maybe 
by removing some malicious tracking cookies or spyware. They do not prevent 
tracking cookies, browser fingerprinting or operating system telemetry just like 
locked doors do not prevent someone from eavesdropping or monitoring when a 
person is at home or not.  
Security and privacy are not mutually exclusive, and it should not be debated on 
whether security or privacy is needed. Both are needded, however also liberty is 
needed to choose and control on how a person is being secured. (Schneier 2006a) 
Governmental organisations want to invade privacy with the pretext of hunting 
terrorists and criminals, however, this should not be used as an excuse to weaken 
one’s rights for privacy. Even if the methods used by these organisations are secure 
and the data acquired is kept only as long as necessary, the user has lost the ability to 
control the data collected from. In addition, plenty of privacy infringements or data 
leaks happen not with malicious intent but out of the sheer thoughtlessness and 
carelessness when handling private or sensitive data. (Solove 2004) 
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3.2 Privacy and Anonymity 
The Internet enables the individual to become anonymous or at least pseudo-
anonymous with the help of nicknames and multiple accounts, which can be totally 
irrelevant to one’s real self. This makes it easy to voice opinions without being afraid 
of repercussions from friends, family, colleagues or authorities. However, being 
anonymous or having separate accounts does not provide privacy. A person’s actions 
can still be tracked page-by-page and new techniques make it possible to distinquish 
the user’s unique fingerprint from the thousands of similar anonymous accounts or 
page visits. Actions can be correlated to each other, accounts linked to each other 
and it only needs one of these accounts with links to the user’s real persona for the 
whole anonymity to lose its meaning. Of course, this requires vast resources and a 
heavy reason to be implemented; however having privacy through full anonymity is 
just an illusion. 
Too much anonymity can eventually lead to a system failure. Wikipedia, eBay and 
many other sites use pseudo-anonymous accounts where the user does not have to 
publish personal information any more than it is necessary; however, this still makes 
the users accountable and reputable for their actions inside these systems. This also 
makes it easier to trust users when one can put a name or an identity on them, albeit 
using a pseudonym. Without the aliases and nicknames, anyone could sabotage a 
Wikipedia page or create scam purchases or transactions in eBay. "Privacy can only 
be won by trust, and trust requires persistent identity, if only pseudo-anonymously." 
(Kelly 2006) 
3.3 Ephemeral Conversations 
One huge concern for privacy on the Internet is the disability to forget things. There 
is no common and sure way to delete data once it has been on the Internet. One 
cannot have ephemeral conversations, where the conversation or data transfer only 
takse place once and is totally forgotten after that. Anything that can be actively 
monitored can also be recorded in some way, and this also applies to the Internet 
where conversations are essentially exchanges of packet data. Even if the data is 
protected with the best encryption scheme possible, it is still possible to record every 
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packet in the conversation and store it for later times when maybe the encryption 
becomes obsolete and can be cracked. Even if the information given to a service is 
irrelevant to the user today or the service provider pledges to protect their user’s 
privacy, who guarantees this will always be the case? Big companies can change their 
privacy policy any time they want or the individual may later regret what they have 
said and wants to take it back, however, the data still remains the same. (Schneier 
2006b) 
The automatic collection of conversations is in nature very impersonal, as it is not a 
human who collects and observes the information, but a machine or a complex 
system. This makes people accept it more easily as it is considered to be less invasive. 
The "I don't have any secrets" way of thinking can also be considered a wrong 
starting point to privacy. Daniel J. Solove (Solove 2004) calls this "security paradigm" 
and points out that privacy can still be infringed even if the information revealed is 
considered to be public knowledge. 
3.4 Data collection and loss of control 
The basic and most debated privacy issue with the Internet is the ability to collect 
data. Data can be collected both directly by analyzing conversations, images or even 
video files by applying e.g. keyword searches or facial recognition, or indirectly with 
the help of cookies, fingerprint techniques or metadata. It is trivial to record anything 
and everything the user does, as all of this can happen automatically and requires no 
intervention or a supervising user. The data collection can seem mostly harmless, 
such as analysis of purchase history through eBay for better marketing or analysis of 
browsing habits to tailor ads for the user. However, it can also include so-called 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), which McCallister, Grance and Scarfone 
(2010) describe as "any information about an individual maintained by an agency, 
including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual‘s 
identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother‘s 
maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other information that is linked or 
linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment 
information." 
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This data collection happens in the background,is invisible to the user and usually 
there is no method of opting out. This violates the right to control how, when and 
what data is being collected from the user, the point of what Westin (Westin 1967) 
employed to describe privacy. As there also exists no method for the user to identify 
what data is recorded from his activity, there is also no way to distinguish if the data 
collected is relevant to the user’s interest or if the collecting party is acting with 
malicious intent. The user has effectively lost control of his/her data, who can access 
and use it and who it can be shared to. For the collecting party, the data is indexed, 
easily searchable and identifiable at any point. 
The user may be told that data is collected. The European Union mandates that 
websites hosted in the member countries notify the user that the site uses cookies to 
track the user (European Parliament and the Council 2002). Later amendment 
(European Parliament and the Council 2009) also states that explicit consent from 
the user is required to use the cookies in the first place, as the previous version only 
required the user to be notified about them. In Finland, the legislation for PII data 
523/1999 (Finlex 1999) requires the service providers to both ask for the users 
permission to collect sensitive information (Finlex 1999, section 8§) and to inform 
the user that they uphold a PII registry (Finlex 1999, section 10§). However, no 
universal legislation or directive for generic non-PII data collection exists. The terms 
of service usually include disclaimers that user activity may be collected and used to 
provide better services. Neither can the user opt-out some of these functions as that 
would prevent them from using the service. Tracking cookies are automatically 
accepted by using the website. After a while of using Google search, the user must 
agree to their privacy reminder (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Google privacy reminder 
A great deal of the control provided is also illusory. The user is given the option to 
limit access to their data or promises on data privacy for now, however, the service 
provider can dictate ultimately how and when to utilize data collection and who they 
share the data with. The terms of service can easily be changed, and most users will 
not notice any changes in their day-to-day activity. (Schneier 2006c) 
15 
 
 
3.5 Data brokers and reuse of data 
Data brokers are the aggregators of collected personal data. They get feeds from 
industry customer systems, direct marketing, questionnaires, credit bureau 
information and governmental public records. The data is combined, correlated to 
dossiers and sold to marketers and ad networks. The data can consist of 
demographic data, lists of purchases or any kind of PII or non-PII data that can be 
combined together. (Schneier 2015) 
Another issue with reusing second-hand data is that it was not collected for the 
application, and discrepancies may occur. For example, a data collected from a 
political forum can be used to predict the outcome of election; however, using the 
same dataset to rule out extremist criminal activity or terrorism will trigger plenty of 
false positives. The data corruption rate in marketing databases is very high since 
users can fill out feedback forms seemingly randomly, so the data is useless for 
deeper analytical purposes. (Schneier 2007) 
Brokered data can ultimately also be used for governmental and law enforcement 
purposes. However, extra care should be taken when making decisions using a 
subset of personal information. Just as one’s person or personality is not the sum of 
his/her actions and thoughts, one’s digital person is not the sum of the information 
collected from him/her. The information can be hand-picked or sanitized in ways that 
will distort the digital image describing the persons and if this is then used for 
decisions affecting their lives, mistakes can easily be made. (Solove 2004) 
3.6 Correlation 
As data brokers can gather virtually endless amounts of data, they can also correlate 
them. The data gathered from simple demographic information combined with e.g. 
purchase history can be used to define the person’s sexual interest, risks of gambling 
or substance addiction or even to predict genetic diseases or mental issues before 
the person knows this him-/herself (Foster 2014). 
Personally Identifiable Information can be used to distinguish specific individuals 
from any number of people. When this information is related to other PII data, it is 
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considered linked or linkable. Linked data is considered to exist in the same system 
as the primary data, linkable data is remote; however, readily obtainable or public 
(McCallister, Grance & Scarfone 2010). This kind of linked data can be correlated and 
augment the information at hand about the individual. 
Even if the data is anonymized or contains no PII entries, it can still be used in 
correlation with other data to distinguish individuals from each other. At the very 
lowest, a digital identity can be constructed using the correlation and separate pieces 
of user activity, possibly connecting several pseudonyms the user has on different 
services. On higher levels, the data can be used to identify a person by removing 
commons from the anonymous dataset and using so-called "micro-data" that is 
specific to the individual. Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov cross-referenced 
anonymous movie ratings of 500 000 Netflix subscribers to IMDb movie ratings and 
were able to connect the subscriber information to the corresponding IMDb user 
account by removing the top 500 watched movies from the equation. Similar 
methods can be employed on datasets where PII identifiers have been removed if 
the attacker has enough context and background information (Narayanan & 
Shmatikov 2008) 
3.7 Termination of Authentication 
When user wants to stop using the service, he/she can usually delete the account 
either via the account options or by creating a service request to the service 
provider. What happens to the data stored depends totally on the service provider 
and usually the user has little or no control on this. In Finland, the legislation 
523/1999 subsection 26§ (Finlex 1999) allows anyone to request any organisation 
that maintains a PII database to present the dataset that has been collected from the 
individual person. The legislation subsection 29§ also allows the user to request a 
correction or deletion of the data. This legislation does not affect non-PII data, such 
as pseudonymous forums, social media or websites, or services provided from 
outside of Finland. 
Another example of mandatory authentication is using webstores for purchases. 
Usually an account is required to do business, which includes the user’s name, 
17 
 
 
address, contact and credit card information. Even if the user completes their 
purchase as a guest, this same data is still required to deliver the product and bill the 
user. However, when the customer has paid and received their product, there is no 
sure way to remove this information from the provider database. This is not only a 
security concern, where malicious parties can use this data for identity thefts, but 
also a privacy concern as a data leak from the provider can make the individuals 
purchase history public. (Schneier 2005) 
4 Motivations behind data collection 
4.1 Advertisers 
The Internet is the most prominent place for advertising in the modern era. Ads can 
be placed not only on webpages but also on tablets and smartphone apps or other 
smart devices such as internet-enabled TVs. The competition on providing best ads is 
high, and advertisers have resorted to data collection on users to provide more 
relevant ads based on the browsing habits and interests of individual users. Several 
organisations exist only to provide ads and collect information from webpages. 
DoubleClick is one of the oldest advertisement and data collection networks. 
Originally founded in 1996, it started as a small business providing primarily banner 
ads and evolved into a large-scale ad network until 2007, when Google acquired it 
(Citation needed). Many other networks have followed and the model has evolved to 
having ad exchanges, which can be used both for data agencies to send their 
customer data in and advertisers to send their ads and targets. This way the ad 
exchange or ad network generates targeted marketing. Targeted marketing relies 
heavily on user tracking (e.g. search patterns) to provide the most interesting ads to 
the target audience (Figure 2) (Soni 2017). 
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Figure 2. Digital advertising with ad exchanges/networks (Soni 2017) 
Web stores can categorize clients as “high spenders” if they seem to be not 
interested in the prices of products, which allows the web store to raise the prices 
for these kind of people or offer coupons and sale prices to other, more price-
sensitive clients. This is called “personalized pricing” or “price discrimination” and it 
can be easily done by tracking the user’s purchase and browsing habits in the e-store. 
This is generally considered in the least shady or even ethically wrong by people. 
(Borgesius 2017)  
Other way to categorize is to use demographic data from data brokers to create 
marketable categories, e.g. “gullible seniors” list of persons could be used to push 
aggressive ads for medical care or living aids (Schneier 2015). 
4.2 Organisation and workplace surveillance 
Organisational data for workplaces is usually collected in the name of information 
security. It is deemed to be an important aspect of knowing what happens in the 
organisation’s network system, what data is sent and if company secrets are being 
leaked from the network. Some workplaces employ an invasive mindset of opening 
emails or logging the websites people use during the day. This might be rationalized 
under security or productivity. 
Other reasons to collect data are mainly for advertising reasons as said earlier, 
however, the data can also be used for market research or betterment of customer 
services. Internet-facing webstores usually track the client’s purchases to provide 
better recommendations, coupons, sale vouchers and targeted ads to make and keep 
19 
 
 
repeat customers. Loyalty programs track users heavily based on their purchase 
history and even other page visits if the data is available. (Schneier 2015) 
4.3 Governments and public authorities 
Governmental interest in data collection is usually for greater good. Law 
enforcement requires certain information on suspected crimes or terrorism. Either 
the government or authority itself can collect data using complex systems and public 
records but it can also be third-party data collected that has been mined. Financial 
data, medical records, religion and political interests, employee records can be used 
to profile persons of interest. ISPs are mandated to cooperate with law enforcement 
in many countries, and any organisation can be asked to release information in the 
event of a severe crime. 
In 2012, the Motion Picture Association of America threatened to withdraw 
monetary support from the President of United States if they did not side with the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (Allen 2012). SOPA was considered one tool against Kim 
“Dotcom” Schmitz and his service Megaupload, which was officially a private file 
sharing site; however, it was mainly used to distribute pirated content (Couts 2012). 
In this case, one could say that implementing stronger data collection to weed out 
piracy benefits the government monetarily, even though the data could not be used 
for outright law enforcement purposes. 
A large motivation for profiling people is so called "Social Sorting" where the service 
level offered to an individual is dictated by their identity derived from their social 
network or browsing activity. This kind of profiling has already been used e.g. in 
insurance business, where the insuree’s marital status and residence will affect the 
premium. (Lyon 2009)  On the Internet, it is trivial to allocate better service effort for 
more eligible users, which may lead to a state of discrimination and privilege 
separation even if this was not the original intent. (Brown 2014) 
The user profile information can also be used to mitigate risks, which can lead to 
false positives and unjustified detainment of suspected criminals (Lyon 2009). Public 
authorities can require social networks to hand over data from radical parties or 
suspected criminals. This data can be used to evaluate the further need to monitor 
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the selected individual and maybe organise a wire-tap or some other, more direct 
method of surveillance. This is all rationalized with the pretext of fighting organised 
crime or terrorism, however, the results are inconclusive on how successful this kind 
of crime-prevention is in larger scale. (Schneier 2009) 
4.4 Social networks 
Social networks encourage the individual user to share as much information as 
possible. Facebook allows (and strongly suggests) the user to tag a friend in the 
picture or activity, allowing the social network to include this activity to the profiles 
of all participants. Tagging a place makes the network able to collect crude locations, 
however, including pictures with GPS coordinates will make the location more 
accurate. Many phone cameras allow the user to store the location where the 
pictures where taken in the image EXIF data as can be seen in Figure 1, and some 
models enforce this as the default setting. 
 
Figure 3. EXIF Location data in an image file 
Networks aim to give individual stories maximum disclosure by making the users 
activity public by default. The user can limit the coverage using controls such as the 
Facebooks audience selector tool and friend groups (Figure 4) or Twitter protected 
tweets that are shown only to followers. However, these may not be easy to use and 
they do nothing to limit the access to the information by the social network itself. 
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Figure 4. Facebook audience selector 
Several sites provide social network authentication as the alternative way to use 
their services using OAuth. OAuth is an open protocol to allow authorization based 
on tokens received from the authorizing service, such as Facebook or Google. The 
user can connect their social media account to the service or app and continue using 
the service as long as they stay logged in to the social account as well. This creates a 
new option for the networks to gather information from the users, albeit limited to 
what services the user connects and when, however, the apps/services themselves 
can be overly intrusive and require information from the social account side. For 
example, Spotify by default will publish the user activity in Facebook Activity Log and 
the users Music page if connected via Facebook login. (Spotify Privacy Settings 2017) 
4.5 The value of data 
Data is currently the newest and probably the most valuable commodity on the 
market, and it is often compared to crude oil business in volume (The Economist 
2017). The value of so-called Big Data lies in masses. Data from one individual user 
costs next to nothing in terms of collection, but when the data of thousands or 
millions of users is aggregated, it becomes an incredibly valuable asset in analytics. 
This in turn generates more revenue as more accurate marketing can be 
implemented. In the case of social media such as Facebook, the system feeds itself as 
more people want to join the system, when most of the people are already using it. 
(Schneier 2015). 
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5 User tracking methods 
Data collection and user tracking are not mutually exclusive. Tracking the user’s 
movements in or between webpages collects much information of his/her behavior 
on the Internet. Data collection can take place directly by using the data user has put 
up on the webpage (account information or purchase history for example) or 
indirectly and discreetly with the help of tracking components. As the goal of this 
thesis is to implement user-tracking components to JYVSECTECs RGCE, the main 
focus here will be on tracking methods and indirect information gathering. 
5.1 Client-side and server-side tracking 
This information collection or tracking can be implemented on either server or client-
side. Server-side collection takes place on the server end, distinguishing users by IP 
addresses, user agents and other data that is naturally transmitted when the user 
requests a resource. This kind of tracking is harder to prevent; however, it is also 
easy to spoof and restrict what the server gets. Client-side data collection methods 
rely either on scripts and features set by the site or information exposed directly 
through the browser. This gives the tracking party vastly more information and some 
of the methods are very hard to avoid as blocking them may cause the browser or 
webpage to stop working correctly.  
5.2 Cookies 
Cookies may be the oldest method to track user on the Internet, invented at 
Netscape in 1994. They work by storing site-specific variables in the browser cache of 
the user, making stateful handling possible on the client-side. When the user first 
accesses a page using cookies, the HTTP response includes a Set-Cookie header with 
the format variable=value. The information is then stored in the browser cache, 
either indefinitely or with a specific expiration date. The value stored in the cookie 
variable can be any kind of plaintext data, however, most often a session id is 
generated for the user. Subsequent visits to the page include the cookie data in the 
HTTP request header. The cookie can also be set and read using JavaScript API 
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functions. The cookies are deleted when browser is closed or when the set expiration 
period is exceeded. 
 
Figure 5. Cookies set only for www.reddit.com in Private Browsing mode 
Cookies themselves are no problem to the individual privacy. They are used very 
often to retain site-specific settings such as the session information, shopping cart, 
language, forum theme or any other parameter that enhances the users browsing 
experience (Figure 5). However, some sites using advertisements, usage analytics or 
other reasons to track the user can use so-called third-party cookies. Third-party 
cookies are set in the HTTP headers when the advert or any other resource, e.g. the 
Facebook “like” button image, is requested from the third-party site. The variable is 
set to contain a unique id for each individual user. When the user browses to another 
site that uses the same third-party content, the cookie is then sent to the third-party 
site again, exposing this unique ID and user (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Third-party cookies from different sources for www.reddit.com 
The data collection may be augmented further with the use of referer information 
that exposes the original webpage URL to the tracking party. The original webpage 
can send referer HTTP header (Figure 7) when requesting resources or directly 
embed a HTTP GET parameter, e.g: <img src="image.jpg&referer=thissite.com">. This 
makes it trivial to collect information on browsing habits of the cookie holder, even if 
the user changes network for a portable device. 
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Figure 7. HTTP Referer URL sent when requesting Microsoft Bing Advertisement 
tracking scripts from www.power.fi 
 
One way to allow the user to opt-out of tracking is the use of AdChoices. AdChoices is 
a self-regulated program, originally established by the Digital Advertising Alliance 
(DAA). The program currently has over 200 participants and includes major 
organisations such as Facebook, Google and Microsoft. (YourAdChoices 2017) The 
user can visit http://youradchoices.com/ and set which ad networks he wishes to 
allow. This, however, requires the use of a third-party cookie, which makes it 
unusable when user sets his browser to deny third-party cookies. In addition, as the 
program is self-regulatory, nothing forces the advertisers to implement the 
AdChoices handling. (EFF 2017) 
The WWW Consortium (W3C) initially tried to give the users the option to block the 
third-party cookies with Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P), which is a 
protocol allowing the websites to send their privacy practices to the client browsers. 
The mechanism relied on user-agents and automation, making the user able to select 
his privacy settings once and automating the acceptance of the data collection 
mechanisms per-page, avoiding the need to read the privacy policy for all the visited 
sites. This kind of mechanism was already thought by Lawrence Lessig (2006), who 
describes a concept of negotiation between the user and the machine by pre-set 
rules of contract. The P3P project was suspended in 2006 as both browsers did not 
support it fully, and the web developers thought it was too complex to implement 
(Figure 8). (Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project 2007) 
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Figure 8. Google returns an informational message instead of a working P3P policy  
 
After the P3P, the focus moved on to Do Not Track (DNT), which is a simple HTTP 
header message, implying the user’s wish they are not tracked on the webpage. The 
W3C established a working group for it in 2011, however, after a year the progress 
stalled and eventually the DAA pulled out of the project. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) has continued work on tightening the DNT policy and implemented 
their own browser add-on, Privacy Badger, for cases when the sites do not comply 
with the DNT header. DNT is implemented in all current browsers. (EFF 2017) 
DNT has not been a success as there is no consensus on what kind of tracking it 
concerns. The header only implies if the user wants to disable tracking or not, it does 
not separate the methods used (such as cookies, advertising id or fingerprint) 
(Miners 2014). Advertisers have also raised controversy on the topic whether DNT or 
other tracking protection should be implemented by default. Microsoft tried to apply 
DNT as the default setting in Internet Explorer 10 from 2012 onwards, until they 
removed this default in IE10/IE11 2015 (Keizer 2015). During the time of writing this 
thesis, Apple has changed the behavior of the Safari browser to block third-party 
cookies by default, which again has raised controversy against them (Statt 2017). 
W3C is still working on the technique under the name Tracking Preference 
Expression, howeverm the work is still at recommendation level (W3C 2015).  
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5.3 Beacons 
A web beacon or a web bug is a simple, possibly invisible resource placed on the 
webpage. Beacons can be transparent GIF or PNG images, scripts, HTTP IFRAME 
elements, or any other resource that is requested from the server. They can also be 
visible elements, such as advertisements or social media buttons (Facebook “like” 
button for example). When the requested beacon resource is downloaded from the 
server, it automatically leaves a log entry, which can contain the IP address, user-
agent and referring URL from the webpage. Beacons can be used to track when a 
user opens a certain page or e-mail, as e-mails can be HTML encoded also. Many e-
mail clients can be configured to block web content in order to disable beacon 
activity. Beacons can be coupled with HTTP cookies or URL queries to transmit more 
data when the resource is requested (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Pixel beacon www.reddit.com, sending data with URL parameters. 
 
Mozilla Developers (MDN 2017a) have been experimenting in implementing a 
Beacon API, a common way of creating a beacon request to the server. This method 
uses a separate HTTP POST request and does not require any additional resource to 
be  requested from the server. The API is supported in Google Chrome, Microsoft 
Edge, Mozilla Firefox and Opera browsers (MDN 2017a). 
Facebook tried to implement its own beacon system in 2007, where user activity 
could be collected from the webpage and published automatically in the user’s 
activity feed. This promptly resulted in a class-action lawsuit as the users were not 
happy with the invasion in privacy, forcing Facebook to shut down their beacon 
implementation in 2009 (Telegraph 2009). 
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5.4 ETags 
ETags (Entity tags) are a form of headers that can be used to differentiate a version 
of a certain resource. For example, an image file may have ETag associated to it at 
the first time it is requested from the server (Figure 10). Subsequent requests will 
include an HTTP Header "If-Match" or "If-None-Match" containing the ETag value. 
This way the server knows if the resource that is being requested has already been 
served. If the ETag value matches, server can return HTTP 304 Not Modified which 
makes the browser use the old resource from the cache. If the ETag does not match 
the one the server uses, the resource has been changed and will be sent again. (MDN 
2017b) 
ETags can also be used to track the user. The server can assign a pseudo-unique ETag 
to a resource served for the user, for example an image. Subsequent requests from 
the same user will include the same ETag and can be used to log the user. Instead of 
ETags, HTTP Last-Modified header value may also be used as it can hold any random 
string and does not necessarily need to be a date (Bujlow et al. 2015). Since these 
methods do not rely on cookies but the browser cache, they are impervious to the 
user clearing cookies on browser exit or blocking of third-party cookies. Full browser 
cache clearing, however, will remove the ETags or Last-Modified timestamps from 
the memory. 
 
Figure 10. ETag and Last-Modified headers for the Reddit favicon file.  
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5.5 Other client-side mechanisms 
Cookies are not the only method of placing tracking on client-side. Bujlow et al. 
(2015) describe multiple other mechanisms that can be used: 
 JavaScript session variables can also be used to store up to 2Mb data. 
 HTTP Basic Authentication. Based on the HTTP protocol, uses HTTP header 
information to send  authentication parameters to server. Once user logs in, the 
basic authentication session stays in the browser cache until the browser is closed, 
making it possible to track the user. Limited to the same domain. 
 URL query strings. HTTP GET parameters can be used to track the user even when 
switching domain (for example www.domain.com&trackingid=1234). Does not store 
information on the browser level, but using the same URL again will send the same 
parameters. Used mainly for referer tracking in search engines. 
 Hidden form fields. A hidden form and fields may be injected into a webpage, 
transferring information in HTTP GET or POST request. If GET is used, works similar 
to URL query strings but when POST is used, data is sent in headers instead. 
 Plugin storage. Both Adobe Flash and Microsoft Silverlight provide a way to store 
data in the client browser plugin cache. Flash Local Shared Objects are usually also 
called Flash Cookies, Supercookies or Zombie cookies. They can be recreated even 
after the browser deletes them and they are shared across browsers. Java JNLP 
Persistence-Service can also be used to store local data. 
 Google Gears. Gears makes it possible to store data locally. User has to give his 
permission for Gears to store data so it is not well suited for data collection/tracking 
without the user knowing. Google Gears was discontinued in 2011 
 window.name Javascript DOM property. All browsers support the commond 
Document Object Model (DOM) and this includes a property called window.name. 
This property can contain few megabytes of data. As the property is the same for all 
tabs in the same window, it can be used for tracking across various websites opened 
in separate tabs. 
 HTML5 Local and Session storage. Local-storage can be used to store data 
permanently as it has no expiration set by default. Session storage works similarly 
but is emptied when the browser is closed. 
 Web SQL Database and HTML5 IndexedDB. These are both mechanisms for creating 
a database in the client-side for easy structured data storage. The latter is a feature 
of HTML5 and has mainly replaced the former Web SQL.  
 Internet Explorer userData storage can store data in XML format 
 
It is also possible to use HTTP 301 or JavaScript redirection to make URL query string 
or third-party cookie usage easier. When the user accesses the page, he/she is 
redirected to another page first that sets the cookies or returns to the same page 
with the URL query string appended to the URL. As many browsers only deny setting 
but not reading third-party cookies, this only needs to be done once when the user 
first comes to the page. (Bujlow et al. 2015) 
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Since the web browser can render the page differently for different users, for 
example when the user is logged in, specially constructed timing attacks or pixel-
stealing can be used to read the browser history or arbitrary graphics data from the 
webpage. (ibid., 2015) 
5.6 Supercookies 
Since cookies are essentially tied to the domain, big corporations such as Microsoft 
and Google have a problem when they are using multiple different domains such as 
microsoft.com, live.com and bing.com. To solve this, they use Cookie Syncing, where 
the same cookie information is shared between multiple domains via so-called 
supercookies. Supercookies use some other mechanism to recreate the cookie 
information and pass it on to another domain. Microsoft creates supercookies with 
the use of unique identifiers for users embedded in ETags (Mayer 2011) and Google 
uses pixel beacons with Google User ID as the HTTP parameter (Google 2017a). 
Evercookies, also called zombie cookies, are cookies that can be resurrected or 
recreated from scratch even after the cookie cache has been emptied. Multiple local 
storage types, such as HTML5 local and session storage, HTML5 IndexedDB, WebSQL, 
and ETags can be used to store data that would otherwise be lost. When using Flash 
cookies additionally to traditional cookies, the evercookies can even be rebuilt after 
change or reinstallation of a browser, since they are stored in the separate Flash 
Player plugin cache. 
5.7 Fingerprinting 
Fingerprinting is the method of collecting trivial bits of information and compiling 
these together to create a unique identifier or fingerprint that distinguishes the user 
from others. The information can be collected from many sources, such as network 
and geolocation information, device information such as operating system, screen 
size, available fonts or browser version and available plugins. None of these 
themselves are enough to identify a single user and as many web users will have 
similar devices (operating system and browser for example) there will be many very 
similar fingerprints generated. However, any single small change such as a different 
30 
 
 
version of a plugin or device driver will be enough to make the fingerprint unique 
among millions.  
The effect of fingerprinting can be easily demonstrated using the EFFs Panopticlick 
(Figure 11) which tests a base set of different ways to generate a fingerprint for the 
user (EFF 2018b). The test generated a unique fingerprint with ease for the authors 
PC, which is not a very standard issue and contains many plugins. Redoing the test 
with a company laptop yielded similar results. 
 
Figure 11. Panopticlick results as tested at https://panopticlick.eff.org/ 
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Another, even more accurate method to generate a unique fingerprint is canvas 
fingerprinting, which utilises the browsers drawable area, called canvas and 
JavaScript or some other script language. The canvas fingerprinting script draws 
invisible images containing a piece of text or WebGL imagery on the canvas and 
extracts the result image as a pixel data (Figure 12). This occurs in seconds or even 
milliseconds, without the user seeing anything on the webpage. As client machines 
can have differing fonts, browsers or graphic drivers, the resulting image can differ 
by mere pixels, making the fingerprint unique. (Acar et al. 2014) 
 
Figure 12. Canvas fingerprinting (Acar et al. 2014) 
 
These mechanisms do not work very well for similar clients using the same base 
image such as organisation workers or schools. For home users they are hard to 
prevent as any number of plugins or changes in the browser will just add more noise. 
Canvas fingerprinting also uses legitimate API in the browser and disabling this will 
break many pages that use the feature. Acar et al. (2014) suggest that using Tor 
Browser is the most effective way to prevent canvas fingerprinting as other methods 
seem to be ineffective. Fingerprinting usually relies heavily on client-side scripts such 
as JavaScript but other methods such as pure CSS-based fingerprinting have been 
explored (Böhmer 2018). 
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5.8 HSTS Fingerprint 
When a client requests a resource using only the domain name, such as 
www.google.com or even just google.com, the default behavior of browsers is to use 
HTTP protocol and try http://www.google.com. This means that by default, plaintext 
HTTP protocol is used instead of secure HTTPS. Traditionally, this has been solved by 
redirecting the user to HTTPS connection, however, a man-in-the-middle attack 
made it possible to intercept data and pass it on via HTTP protocol. HTTP Strict 
Transport Security (HSTS) was created as a way for the server to signal the client that 
a resource can only be served using HTTPS. This way a man-in-the-middle attack 
cannot serve the record as plaintext HTTP as the browser would ignore the result. 
HSTS results are cached permanently in modern browsers unless the user clears the 
cache manually, which allows using HSTS for tracking. This allows the generation of 
an HSTS fingerprint. (Stockley 2015) 
HSTS Fingerprint is generated by making the client request several benign files, such 
as pixel images or empty text files. The server side then sets HSTS reply for some of 
these, which are cached. Next time the user visits the page and loads these files, the 
ones that were replied with HSTS will be requested with HTTPS and others will be 
requested with HTTP. If the server handles the requests with HTTPS as binary one’s 
and HTTP as zeroes, the user can be handed a pseudo-unique identifier with N bits, 
where N is the number of files originally requested. For example, with just 16 
different files 65536 different users can be distinguished. (Stockley 2015) 
5.9 Ad identifiers 
Google uses a user-specific identifier for offering targeted ads to the users in their 
Android OS and Play services. This id can then be directly employed in their 
respective operating systems, removing the need to use other, possibly more 
invasive tracking methods. The AdID resets every year or the user can reset it by 
himself in the account settings menu (Figure 13). The AdID is required for all new 
apps in place of other device identifiers and usage violations will trigger a warning for 
the developers (Google 2017b). Microsoft and Apple have followed this ideology and 
are implementing their own identifiers in their systems. 
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Figure 13. Advertising settings in Android 
 
5.10 Network-level tracking and metadata 
The simplest method to track user in network level is to store the users IP address. 
This is not, however, feasible as due to limitations in IPv4 address space majority of 
individual users at home have a dynamic IP address that can change anytime. Some 
users such as organisation workers and users using mobile clients are also behind a 
firewall and NAT, where the user’s public IPv4 address may be shared between 
hundreds of other possible endpoints. IPv4 address blocks can, however, be used for 
coarse geolocational tracking with the use of Geo-IP databases. 
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IPv6 changes this behavior somewhat as the address space is vastly larger. Operators 
and ISPs can assign larger address spaces for customers and any endpoint can have a 
unique IPv6 address. IPv6 does not have or need NAT, all addresses are globally 
routable. Since Stateless Address Autoconfig (SLAAC) allows endpoints to assign IPv6 
addresses from a network automatically using their hardware MAC address, they 
should also be indistinguishable. This has woken some interest to lobby the use of 
IPv6 with the agenda of better law enforcement (Jackson 2012) or ad serving (Gauss 
2017). There has been concerns on using IPv6 unique addresses for cyberstalking or 
terrorism too (Groat et al. 2011).  
However, the specifications for IPv6 Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address 
Autoconfig (RFC4941) and additional RFCs such as RFC3972 (RFC3972) and RFC7217 
(RFC7217) make it possible to create interface-specific temporary addresses and 
allow the change of the IPv6 address for use in different transactions. The IPv6 
Privacy Extensions are on for all modern operating systems by default, which will 
effectively prohibit the use of IPv6 addresses for pinpointing certain users with the 
use of their IPv6 address only. IPSec tunneling may also be used to encrypt and 
tunnel the payload in the IPv6 network (ibid., 2011). 
Another way of tracking the user on network-level is adding metadata to packets 
when they leave the user’s network and enter the ISPs or Operators network. 
Jonathan Mayer (2014) explains in his blog how Verizon Wireless inserts a unique X-
UIDH identifier to all HTTP headers at the network transit level. This header value is 
then used at the destination or third party website to direct requests to advertising 
exchange. If the user has not opted out of Verizon Selects, their targeted marketing, 
deep packet inspection can also be used to create a behavioral profile. AT&T similarly 
has been found to sell real-time data through their Mobile Identity API containing 
Personally Identifiable Information, such as users name and address information 
(Neustrom 2017). 
Network-level data collection is considered more invasive to privacy because it 
cannot be blocked with cookie deletion or blocking, or any other means performed 
on the client level. A great deal of the data collected on network level is so-called 
metadata, data that is not directly relevant to the user’s actions, but linked to it. This 
kind of data can include e.g. the IP address, port/protocol numbers, user-agent, 
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network type, device identifier, location or even the Personally Identifiable 
Information of the customer. Metadata is considered to be less sensitive information 
by the organisations and governments collecting it, making metadata collection 
acceptable in the context of many legislations. However, as metadata can be 
collected on network-level, it can be used to create a more detailed image of the 
user than using traditional data collection from the client-side. Compiling these 
individual images together gives organisations and governments the ability to create 
an overall view of total population, possibly even over continents. (Privacy 
International 2017) 
5.11 Operating system telemetry 
As the interests for information collection and user tracking have increased, modern 
operating systems have also evolved to provide data collection natively. This is also 
called telemetry. Before integrated telemetry, data collection had to be done with 
the help of spyware, i.e. specific pieces of software applications that were usually 
bundled together with legitimate applications or distributed via drive-by-downloads 
where the users were tricked into downloading the software by masquerading it to 
be an image or document file. 
Telemetry works by collecting data on the operating system level using built-in 
commands and processes that are hard to separate from legitimate services or 
applications. After the introduction of Windows 10, Microsoft has constantly been 
accused of spying the users and collecting irrelevant information, with no universally 
working option to turn the telemetry off. Some of the telemetry functions have been 
confirmed to have been retrofitted to Windows 7 and 8 also. (Leonhard 2016) 
Android makes it trivial for Google to collect data on their user’s activities in multiple 
ways when they are using their phones. Opt-out mechanisms exist, however, they 
need to be activated one-by-one. Bundled with aforementioned Google’s 
Advertisement id, targeted ads are very easy to push to the users. 
Telemetry does not happen just on the operating system level. Geforce Experience, 
the control panel and Nvidia graphics driver companion application have collected 
crash reports and usage data for a long time, however, it was recently upgraded to 
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include automatic telemetry option which seemingly cannot be turned off. The 
software also requires a mandatory login via either Google or Facebook account. 
nVidia Privacy Policy does state that they do not collect Personally Identifiable 
Information, however, there is also no method of opting out of the collection other 
than not using it. (Burke 2016) 
A totally new privacy issue is the spread of so-called smart devices, household 
appliances that are internet-enabled and run a specific operating system. These 
devices can contain unpatchable security vulnerabilities, which in turn can be used to 
monitor the user. They also include native ways to collect telemetry data from the 
user. One example is the Android application for Bose Bluetooth noise-cancelling 
headphones, Bose Connect, which was found to transmit music and audio data to 
third parties for data mining (Kyle vs Bose 2017) 
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6 Evasion tools 
6.1 Browser integrated options 
Most modern browsers include some options to enhance privacy and disable some 
tracking components. All major browsers currently allow the user to block third-party 
cookies and to delete cookies every time the browser is closed, even if their 
expiration is set to far in the future. These are, however, not default and deleting 
cookies every time the browser is closed will weaken user experience on some pages 
that rely heavily on cookies, making the users choose convenience over privacy. 
Third-party cookie blocking also does nothing for first-party cookies, which can be set 
and read by client-side or server-side script included in the first-party site. 
Browsers also send Do Not Track requests either by default or for private browsing 
sessions. Private browsing sessions open up a new window that should lose all stored 
data when the private session is closed (Figure 14). The names vary by software 
(Private Browse, Incognito, InPrivate mode). 
 
Figure 14. Incognito mode in Google Chrome 
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Firefox has a Tracking Protection feature (Figure 15) since version 57, however, it is 
enabled by default on Private Browsing windows only. It uses ad and tracker-blocking 
services of Disconnect.me –service, which also has its own plugin for other software 
(Disconnect.me 2018). Private browsing also ignores the previously stored HSTS 
information so HSTS fingerprinting does not work. 
 
Figure 15. Tracking Protection settings 
 
Some features in the browsers do not enhance but weaken the privacy by default. A 
good example is page prediction included in Google Chrome, which preloads and 
pre-renders some web content based on browsing history. This might load pages and 
tracking elements unbeknownst to the user in the background. Similar effect is on 
search prediction, which sends data to Google and suggests search patterns based on 
history. These features are on by default (Figure 16) 
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Figure 16. Chrome Privacy settings 
 
Microsoft Edge sends a great deal of Telemetry data by default using the Windows 
10 native Telemetry collection. It also seems that it stores plenty of data locally as 
Artefacts, even if the user uses InPrivate mode (Muir 2015)  
Apple Safari includes several options to enhance browsing privacy, for example third-
party cookies are blocked by default. The newest version uses the Intelligent Tracking 
Prevention provided by the Webkit engine, which uses machine learning to remove 
cross-site tracking (Webkit.org 2018). This setting is on and has raised some 
controversy as advertisers feel this is considered “sabotaging the economic model for 
the Internet” (Macrumors 2018). 
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More privacy-oriented browsers such as the ones selected for the implementation 
tests include more built-in methods, and they are also enabled by default. For 
example, Brave browser includes a so-called ‘Shields’ –function, which provides the 
user a quick glance of what components can be and are currently blocked (Figure 
17). These functions work mainly via the use of blocklists from AdBlock Easylist and 
Disconnect.me combined with hard-coded siteHacks (Hirahara 2017). 
  
Figure 17. Brave Shields 
Brave has also the possibility to opt-in to ads that are considered harmless or non-
intrusive. Brave Team’s next step in the line is to replace blocked ads with selected 
Brave Ads, utilizing an anonymity protocol. The ultimate goal for the Team is to 
replace the current ad model with a blockchain-based token called Basic Attention 
Token (BAT). BAT provides micropayments to web browsing, recording the user 
attention on advertisements, which in turn earns them tokens. The tokens can then 
be used to acquire better content, leave or up-/downvote comments, or even 
convert the tokens to real money. (Brave 2018) 
TorBrowser is the Tor Project’s take on creating a privacy-enhanced browser. It is 
based on Firefox 52 Extended Support Release (ESR), uses the distributed TOR 
network by default and also employs various techniques to block tracking at the 
browser level. One key philosophy in Tor Browser is that it does not use filter- or 
blocklist-based addons, as “…these addons do not add any real privacy to a proper 
implementation of the above privacy requirements, and that development efforts 
should be focused on general solutions that prevent tracking by all third parties, 
rather than a list of specific URLs or hosts.” (Perry et al. 2018) 
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Torbrowser has a specifically crafted Cross-Origin Indentifier Unlinkability feature 
(also called First Party Isolation by the Firefox team), which ties the identifier cookies 
and other browser state information to the domain only in the URL bar. This is 
combined with so-called “double-keying”, where every first party scope receives its 
own third party scope.  This effectively renders third party cookie tracking across 
multiple sites useless; yet, still retains the functionality that requires third-party 
cookies. A similar feature, Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability is included to 
prevent fingerprinting across domains. (Perry et al. 2018) 
6.2 Ad blockers 
Ad blockers were originally created as tools for blocking intrusive ads on pages. 
Banners, popups, or flash content can be blocked using simple plugins such as 
AdBlock, AdBlock Plus, uBlock Origin or Disconnect.me that match HTML elements or 
images based on class names or domains. Better ad blockers can block Google 
AdWord search results and YouTube ads also. Usually plugins like these are based on 
blocklists that are maintained and updated regularly. Combining several blocklists 
usually gives the best result (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18. Few of the blocklists used in uBlock Origin 
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These blocklists can be used to block tracking elements and domains, which are 
usually combined into ads anyway. However, as the blocklists usually contain high-
level domains, big companies such as Google, Facebook or Amazon cannot be 
blocked as that would effectively deny all usage of their services. 
Other way to block ads, trackers and spyware is to use network-level tools such as Pi-
hole (Figure 19) that block the requests at Domain Name System (DNS) level. Every 
webpage visit or other request usually generates a DNS request as the name is 
resolved to an IP address. By circumventing DNS requests pointed to ad networks or 
tracking elements, these requests can be denied without them ever leaving the 
network. This does not, however, work on tracking elements that use hard-coded IP 
addresses such as Windows 10 Telemetry (Petri 2016). 
 
Figure 19. Pi-hole dashboard 
 
6.3 Script blockers 
A great number of tracking elements are based on scripts embedded on the 
webpages. They get loaded with the page and are run on the client’s browser, 
gathering information and sending it back to the tracking server. Figure 20 shows 
how Google Analytics is inserted on the page and how it calls a JavaScript file 
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analytics.js from the Google servers. The script creates a tracking object with the 
unique identified UA-XXXX-Y and sends the command pageview to the analytics 
engine, ranking the currently loaded page up. (Google 2018) 
 
Figure 20. Google Analytics (Google 2018) 
 
Fingerprinting (see section 5.7) is one tracking element that fully uses client-side 
scripts to collect as much information from the browser as it can. These kind of 
scripts can be blocked with the use of plugins such as NoScript or uMatrix, which use 
blocklists and user-generated rules to either allow or deny scripts on the webpage 
(Figure 21).  
 
Figure 21. Scripts blocked for www.reddit.com by NoScript extension 
 
The additional benefit is that many popups and minor annoyances on pages use 
similar scripts, however, the downside is that many dynamic web pages use scripts 
legitimately to render the page more efficiently. Hence, a great number of pages will 
either break or the user must create whitelist rules to allow those pages, which can 
be time-consuming. 
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6.4 Privacy Badger 
As Do Not Track has not been widely adopted, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
has created a seemingly on-for-all solution for denying tracking elements in the form 
of Privacy Badger. Privacy Badger is a browser plugin that analyzes the use of third-
party content on websites and tries to block offending elements deemed to be 
tracking the user. The system does not use blocklists but instead cross-references 
cookie and script use on different websites with heuristics to find commons and 
checks them using algorithms and policies. The newer versions of Privacy Badger also 
feature blocking of supercookies that use local storage and canvas fingerprinting. 
(EFF 2015) 
All third party elements are deemed “green” first to minimize false positives. When a 
third party element is found on multiple sites and is possibly trying to track the user, 
Privacy Badger moves it to “yellowlist”, where further analysis is necessary. If the 
element is considered to be tracking the user after a period of time, it is set as “red” 
and subsequently blocked (Figure 22). (EFF 2015) 
 
Figure 22. Privacy Badger for a generic news site 
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6.5 Data removal 
The previously explained plugins try to block all possible tracking. Another solution is 
to simply remove unique identifiers that have been stored in the browser cache or 
local storage, such as cookies or local storage objects. Plugins such as Cookie 
Autodelete, Self-destructing-cookies and Forget Me Not are aimed to remove local 
data selected by personal rules. By choosing to delete all cookies/local data by 
default and only store what is relevant, the user can essentially bypass many unique 
identifiers stored locally and still stay logged in to their most used services (Figure 
23). 
 
Figure 23. Settings for Cookie AutoDelete plugin 
 
6.6 Link sanitizers 
As it is possible to include tracking elements in the URL of a webpage using HTTP GET 
parameters, some plugins like UTM Remover and Neat URL have been created to 
sanitize links in URLs (Figure 24). Other plugins remove the tracking elements from 
Google or other search results as they usually contain referral information or HTTP 
redirects. 
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Figure 24. UTM Remover URL example 
 
6.7 Noise generators 
Noise generators such as AdNauseam, TrackMeNot and Canvas Defender have a 
completely different approach to disabling tracking on sites. They are based on the 
premise of obfuscation and making random noise, which will hide the user’s relevant 
interests in the middle of huge data stream. The plugins work by generating false 
clicks on ads (AdNauseam) or by submitting random searches on Google at time 
intervals (TrackMeNot). Canvas Defender works by injecting random noise to the 
canvas fingerprint image, thus making the fingerprint different from the usual one. 
This way the signal-to-noise ratio of the tracking decreases and the tracked data 
becomes unusable. (Howe & Nissenbaum 2017) 
The plugins have raised some controversy as AdNauseam was removed from the 
Google Chrome add-ons (AdNauseam 2017) and TrackMeNot was deemed as not 
worth the time by Bruce Schneier (2006d) as it only adds noise and does not 
anonymize the relevant searches in any way. This way the user is still tracked even 
though random queries are sent at the same time. Another downside is that the 
plugins generate extra bandwidth by constantly sending in queries, which on a 
metered connection will quickly add up. In addition, TrackMeNot enables the users 
to knowingly send in tracked keywords such as “child porn” or “bomb recipes”, which 
can eventually lead to getting flagged on black lists by operators in some countries 
(Schneier 2006d). 
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7 Implementation and testing 
The different tracking methods were implemented and tested by finding a readily 
available application or code that could be dropped in to the test environment. 
JYVSECTEC's Realistic Global Cyber Environment (RGCE) was used as the testing 
platfrom. RGCE is a closed environment or a cyber range that provides an isolated 
sandbox for cyber security activities, such as cyber exercises, training and research 
and development (JYVSECTEC 2017). RGCE includes a global network similar to the 
Internet, which enables realistic modeling of Internet-level networks, services and 
also cyber threats and campaigns. The environment includes a collection of news 
pages and an advertisement system, so these pages could be used for injecting the 
tracking code. A variety of pages was also created for the use of training sessions or 
demonstrations. 
7.1 Test methodology 
Windows 7 was selected as the base system of the tests mainly because RGCE uses 
Windows 7 virtual machines as base images. In addition, as all of the tested tracking 
methods were web-based, the operating system should not matter in the results. 
The base image was a clean install with Adobe Flash version 28.0.0.161 (NPAPI) and 
Java 8u161. 
First, the idea was to test tracking with multiple browsers, however, as Microsoft 
Edge is not available for Windows 7 and Apple has stopped developing Windows 
version of Safari, these two became irrelevant. As EFF and multiple other sources 
seem to favor Firefox as a more privacy-oriented browser, it was selected as the 
main browser for testing. In addition, future demonstration and training cases will be 
heavily Firefox-based. Chrome and IE were used for comparison to see if there were 
major differences in browser behavior. Some new browsers such as Epic, Brave and 
Torbrowser have been created for maximum privacy, so these were also tested for 
reference purposes. 
Torbrowser by default connects to every website via TOR, which caused minor issues. 
RGCE has a TOR implementation but at the moment of writing it was unavailable for 
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testing and as the interest was mainly on browser-level methods it was deemed 
irrelevant. Turning TOR usage off required some manual intervention: 
 Proxy via TOR was turned off (Options – Advanced – Network – Setttings – No Proxy) 
 Local DNS was set to be used instead of proxied (about:config – 
network.proxy.socks_remote_dns = false) 
 TOR services were turned off (Extensions: disable Torbutton and TorLauncher) 
 
 
The full list of browsers used for testing as follows: 
 Firefox 58.0.2 
 Chrome 64.0.3282.186 
 Internet Explorer 11.0.9600.17843 
 Epic 62.0.3202.94 
 Brave 0.21.18 
 Torbrowser 52.6.0.6607 
 
A selection of plugins was used for testing evasion techniques. These plugins were 
selected mainly by finding out what other people use by searching the privacy-
oriented subreddit (r/privacy), guides for enhancing privacy and removing tracking 
components and plugin rankings on Firefox Add-ons page. This should represent a 
common view of what a privacy-oriented person would use for daily browsing. In 
addition, many of the alternative plugins use same or very similar implementation, 
for example, all the ad blockers rely on the same blocklists. 
The selected plugins were: 
 uBlock Origin 1.15.10 
 Ghostery 8.0.9.7 
 Disconnect 5.18.21 
 NoScript 10.1.6.5 
 Forget Me Not 0.8.8 
 Privacy Badger 2018.2.5 
 HTTPS Everywhere 2018.4.3 (For the HSTS case only) 
 
Plugins were active one at a time and if needed, browser cache was flushed or the 
user profile deleted and re-created. All separate technologies were tested with clean 
copies of the VM so no residual data was present from previous methods. Private 
browsing mode and Firefox tracking protection was tested also on cases where it 
seemed to might have a difference. 
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7.2 Cookies 
Cookies and beacons could be easily dropped to any existing web page in RGCE, 
however, a working background system for the tracking side was necessary. Mautic 
marketing automation tool was initially selected for this task as it had an open source 
community version and provided the support for both cookies and beacon images. 
The documentation was also top-notch so the software could easily be used for 
future demonstrations and training exercises. 
Mautic uses marketing campaigns and they can be created in a flowchart-kind of tool 
where you can start tracking a user and then make decisions and actions based on 
the user input such as page visits and forms. A demo campaign for a fictional web 
shop Yalando.com was created (Figure 25) that included a raffle where the user can 
insert his e-mail address for further user identification. 
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Figure 25. Campaign for testing with Yalando.com 
 
The user can then be tracked on various web pages by including the Mautic tracking 
script which stores a cookie and loads a tracking beacon from the server. The user 
can be tracked with this script even if he/she skips the e-mail form. The tracking 
script was included in RGCE mockups of Iltalehti.fi and Ampparit.com. As the tests 
were conducted on the same workstation, Mautic recognized the client via IP 
address as the same user. IP tracking was turned off from Mautic settings, leaving 
only tracking via cookies and fingerprint active (Figure 26). 
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Figure 26. Mautic tracking script and methods 
 
Next, cookies were tested by visiting Yalando.com and Iltalehti.fi/Ampparit.com to 
see that cookies are created correctly. Mautic Javascript tracking script (mtc.js) was 
loaded from the server correctly and the script created a cookie for the first party 
domain where the element was referred to. The cookies included a lead or user id, 
which can be used to distinguish the user directly, and a session id for the current 
session, which resets every 30 minutes according to documentation (Mautic 2018). If 
third-party cookies are blocked from the browser settings, no cookie gets sent with 
the request to yalando.com/mtc.js when browsing Iltalehti.fi. If the mtc.js is served 
from the site itself (iltalehti.fi/mtc.js), tracking works as intended. It seemed obvious 
that Mautic wants the tracking party to include the mtc.js from the first party domain 
in order to bypass third-party cookie blocking. 
All general browsers (Firefox, Chrome and Internet Explorer) worked exactly alike. 
Private browse modes such as Incognito and InPrivate rejected the old cookies and 
new tracking identifiers were created for each private browse session. Cookies were 
forgotten automatically when the private browse session ended. Firefox Tracking 
Protection did nothing to evade cookies, as it relies on Do Not Track functionality and 
domain blocklists by Disconnect.me (Disconnect.me 2018). 
The privacy-oriented browsers performed somewhat differently. Epic browser and 
Brave both blocked the tracking by default as no new page visits were registered in 
Mautic. Brave, however, did not show anything in its ‘Shields’ menu as blocked 
(Figure 27). As Brave also does not have a developer console like the other browsers, 
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it was very hard to verify if the cookie was even set. However, allowing the use of 
third-party cookies (by default they are disabled) caused the page visits to register 
correctly in Mautic again. 
 
Figure 27. Brave Shields –view did not register the tracking element 
 
Torbrowser worked slightly differently as the mtc.js script did get run and the cookie 
did get set even though scripts were blocked from the settings. Subsequent visits to 
Iltalehti.fi generated new tracking ids to each and every component requested, 
which seemed to be the result of the Cross-Origin Identifier Unlinkability feature 
explained in chapter 6.1. 
As the testing moved to plugins, Ghostery, uBlock Origin and Disconnect.me were 
found to rely only on blocklists, which by default does nothing to block either the 
mtc.js or the cookies set by it. Blacklisting yalando.com did of course deny the page 
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to load the mtc.js script. However, first party server side cookies will not get blocked 
this way. Noscript otherwise did block the whole script altogether, which results in 
the cookie not been set ever. To further test this, a simple cookie example page was 
created with PHP and it was confirmed that with server-side first party scripts all of 
these extensions did nothing. 
Forget Me Not also by default does not block the cookies, but instead deletes them 
after a set amount of time when the user leaves the sites (Figure 28). Third-party 
cookies can also be deleted after set minutes of creation. Both settings were 
confirmed to work as intended, however, the user must manually whitelist the pages 
that should retain their cookies such as logged in pages etc. 
 
Figure 28. Forget Me Not automatic deletion of cookies 
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The last test was to use Privacy Badger, which should use heuristics to determine 
possible trackers on the web page. With Mautic tracking (Yalando, Iltalehti.fi and 
Ampparit.com), Privacy Badger categorized the third-party access as ‘greenlisted’ 
even with subsequent page visits (Figure 29). This is due to the fact that the cookie 
was set as first-party and Privacy Badger only considers third-party elements as 
tracking elements (Privacy Badger Source Code 2018). 
 
Figure 29. Privacy Badger has greenlisted yalando.com 
 
To be able to demonstrate the heuristic behavior, a separate site set was created 
with different domains (www.a.trk – www.f.trk), which used the previously created 
third-party cookie site. This approach did not initially work as the system did only set 
a sstrackid cookie with an incrementing number for the clients and Privacy Badger 
requires somewhat entropy for the identifier (Privacy Badger Source Code 2018). By 
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adding a second identifier, sstrackmd5 which is the md5 hash of the identifier, 
enough entropy was found and Privacy Badger blocked the request on the third page 
of the site set (Figure 30). 
 
Figure 30. Privacy Badger and a redlisted third party cookie 
 
Source code for the server-side scripts used is included in Appendix 1. 
7.3 Beacons 
Tracking beacon was already implemented in RGCE by Laboratory Engineer Kari 
Nurmi, with the help of ETags and PHP Session cookies. The site includes an invisible 
1x1 GIF pixel that has an ETag value set according to the PHP Session cookie value 
created for the user. The ETag is formatted to look similar to a normal Apache 
webserver ETag value to further masquerade the tracking. PHP Sessions are used to 
hold user information in case the user forces the resource to refresh using 
Ctrl+Shift+R in the browser.  
This system was used as a basis and a new site closely similar to the aforementioned 
server-side cookie page was created. ETag value was replaced by user id similarly to 
the cookie site for easier demonstration (Figure 31). The source code for the 
modified beacon system is included in Appendix 2. The beacon was then injected into 
few webpages in RGCE (ampparit.com and www.*.trk) for testing. 
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Figure 31. User id ETag value and PHP Session ID for the tracking pixel 
 
All general browsers worked the same, ETag was generated for the user and 
subsequent page visits returned HTTP 302 Not Modified for the tracking pixel. 
Forcing a hard refresh (Ctrl+Shift+R) resulted in HTTP 200 OK, however, as the 
session cookie was handled, user id stayed the same. Emptying just web cache or 
cookies did not reset the ID, yet, emptying both at the same time generated a new 
user id. Similar behavior was seen in private browsing. There was a small difference 
using Internet Explorer as the browser had to be closed in order for the cache data to 
really be deleted, other browsers removed the cache entries immediately after using 
the corresponding clear history –tool. 
For the more privacy-oriented browsers, the results differed slightly. Brave did not 
set the HTTP Referer field correctly when sending the request to the tracking server, 
making all the requests seem to come from the tracking first-party. This was found 
out to be a feature in the third-party cookie blocking (Brave 2016). Brave Shields 
showed no tracking elements to be found and the cache was not automatically 
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emptied on browser restart. Clean Reload or Ctrl+Shift+R did not work correctly, as 
the ETag-value still contained the same user id. Using the Session tab or Private tab 
feature did however generate a new id, so it seems that some cache separation is 
done on this level. The lack of developer console prevented further investigation on 
the issue. 
Epic browser worked similarly to Chrome, however, but it has no private browsing. 
TorBrowser generated a new user id for every domain due to the Cross-Origin 
Identifier Unlinkability feature but ETag persisted under subdomains. As third-party 
cookies are denied by default, hard refresh did generate a new user id. Turning 
“Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data” feature off resulted in correctly 
set cookies and so ETag values were retained across domains. 
Testing of plugins yielded similar results as with the cookie case, although no single 
clear method was found that would perform better than just clearing the browser 
cache and cookies. Ghostery, uBlock Origin and Disconnect.me did nothing unless the 
tracking domain was added manually to the blocklists. As both the ETag and cookie 
are set with server-side scripts, NoScript also did nothing. Forget Me Not did clear 
the cookie, but had no option to clear the cache after leaving the domain.  
Privacy Badger did notice and deny the tracking, however, only due to the cookie 
being set. When tested with the cookie setting disabled, third-party content was 
recognized, yet it was not deemed as a tracking component (Figure 32). A GitHub 
issue (Privacy Badger 2017) was found, so blocking trackers using other methods 
than cookies is currently not implemented. 
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Figure 32. Privacy badger did not detect ETag tracking 
 
As the system did not implement reverse correlation from the ETag user id to the 
cookie, deleting cookies and requesting new ones created a new PHP Session and a 
new tracked user id. This could be easily implemented, however, it was left for future 
development. 
7.4 Supercookies 
Supercookies were implemented as a single page as the use case for this kind of 
tracking was mostly to demonstrate the different data storage options supercookies 
would use. Samy Kamkar (2010) has created a JavaScript project called evercookie, 
which uses multiple separate ways of storing data resiliently. Kamkar’s evercookie 
script was used for the implementation as it was open source and required no 
further configuration except a working HTTP server. Some modifications were made 
to the script as it pointed to resources on the real Internet unavailable in the RGCE. 
The original code is also asynchronous, which required some changes on how the 
functions are called in order to demonstrate the evercookie in a better way. The 
index page for the demo site is included in Appendix 3. 
Testing evercookie did not go as smoothly as planned. The browser APIs have 
changed a great deal since 2010 when Kamkar created the evercookie project and 
since it is not actively maintained, most of the features did not seem to work 
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correctly. Some of the features were outright obsolete, such as Flash Local storage 
and Java as these plugins are no longer supported in current browsers. Microsoft 
Silverlight has also been obsoleted. This made cross-browser testing impossible and 
was subsequently dropped from the testing methodology. 
Evercookie script uses the following storage methods for persistent cookie values: 
 pngData: RGB values injected in PNG images using HTML5 similar to ETags 
 etagData: ETag values 
 cacheData: Using the HTTP request cache expiration as a cookie storage 
 userData: Internet Explorer proprietary userData storage. Obsoleted in IE10. 
 cookieData: Cookies 
 globalData: Firefox-specific data storage, obsoleted from Firefox 9 onwards. 
 localData and sessionData: HTML5 standard storage methods. globalData was  
 windowData: Storing the window.name DOM element 
 historyData: Injecting the tracking value into arbitrary HTTP requests and then 
reading the result using visited link status. Fixed back in 2010 in browsers. 
 idbData: IndexedDB 
 dbData: WebSQL database, obsolete and replaced by HTML IndexedDB 
 lsoData: Flash Local Storage (not used in implementation) 
 slData: Microsoft Silverlight (not used in implementation) 
 
The demo site was constructed so that on the first visit it would try to request these 
storages the cookie value and if none of them would hold a value other than 
“unused”, it would then set the cookie in all possible storages. This way the first visit 
set the cookie and subsequent visits showed what storages were used. Persistence 
was tested with restarting the browser and clearing all history data. 
All browsers provided several different storage methods, shown in Table 1.  All 
browsers also cleared every storage when clearing history data, which means the 
methods were not everlasting, although clearing just normal cache and cookies did 
leave residual storage objects behind. 
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Table 1. Working storage methods in different browsers tested 
  Firefox Chrome IE Brave EPIC Tor Browser 
pngData 
 
X 
 
X 
  etagData X X 
 
X X X 
cacheData 
 
X X X X 
 userData 
      cookieData X X X X X X 
localData X X X X X X 
globalData       
sessionData X X X X X X 
windowData X X X X X 
 historyData       
idbData X X X X X  
dbData  X  X X  
 
As can be seen in the table, userData, globalData and historyData did not work on 
any of the browsers as they were either obsolete or fixed. dbData did still work on 
Chrome and Brave/EPIC which are based on Chrome source code even though it is 
obsolete. Chrome and Brave were the only ones that allowed RGB data caching using 
PNG images. Curiously, ETag cookies did not work in IE even though they did work 
when testing the Tracking Beacon ETags. TorBrowser was the only one that did not 
permit the script to read the value from window.name DOM data or IndexedDB. 
Plugin results varied, Ghoster and Disconnect.me and Privacy Badger did nothing, 
however, Ublock Origin blocked the JavaScript file from loading due to the name 
containing “evercookie”, which is blacklisted in the built-in EasyPrivacy –list (Figure 
33). Changing the script name and folder from evercookie to ec allowed the script to 
load. 
61 
 
 
 
Figure 33. Ublock Origin blocks evercookie on keyword-basis 
 
ForgetMeNot did not clear ETag storage as expected from testing with the Tracking 
Beacon, but it did clear all other storage values though. Still, using Firefox built-in 
option to delete all history data on browser closing works better. 
To further test if evercookie could be used to demonstrate persistence older 
browsers were tested as there were base images in RGCE containing Firefox 36 and 
even Firefox 3. However, both versions yielded similar results and even with old 
versions of Flash enabled, no cross-browser persistence could be achieved. Cookie 
data was being set to Flash local storage, however, due to either browser security 
upgrades or code incompatibility, it could not be read from there. This effectively 
made the evercookie not viable for serious demonstrations unless further research is 
done on the subject. 
7.5 HSTS 
HTTP Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS) tracking was implemented both client- and 
server-side in the RGCE domain hsts.trk. Client-side demo uses Ben Friedlands proof-
of-concept code from GitHub (Friedland 2016) and it is implemented using 
JavaScript. The JavaScript calls for several subdomain URLs, from which several set 
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the HSTS header. This way, an N-bit identifier can be stored for the user. For server-
side testing the code was created from scratch using methodology seen in the code 
of GitHub user “nevkontakte” (HSTS Super Cookie 2018), instead, it was 
implemented in PHP. The server-side demo serves the user dynamic CSS stylesheet 
files, which in turn import other CSS files under subdomains that either set or unset 
the HSTS max-age header (Figure 34). The main scripts for the server-side demo are 
included in Appendix 4. 
 
Figure 34. HSTS “bits” requested as css files 
 
During testing, some variation was observed in the browser behaviour. Firefox saves 
the HSTS history in a profile-specific file (SiteSecurityServiceState.txt). Client-side 
JavaScript did not work at all in Internet Explorer 11, and the server-side method 
does not work in InPrivate session. Delete history works correctly in all the browsers. 
Brave and EPIC browsers will delete all history by default when exiting, yet, do not 
mitigate either of the methods during a session. TorBrowser was the only browser 
where neither client-side nor server-side method worked. Client-side JavaScript code 
generated a tracking ID for the user, however, it was different every time the page 
was refreshed. Server-side beacons did not load at all due to a security error when 
requested as third-party, which would point again to the Cross-Origin Identifier 
Unlinkability. 
Not any of the plugins could be used to block the HSTS tracking from working, not 
even Forget Me Not, as it cannot remove the HSTS site data stored in Firefox profile. 
Privacy Badger did nothing even though the server-side code was included in 
multiple sites similar to previous methods as no traditional cookie is being set. 
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NoScript blocked the JavaScript but did nothing to the server-side method. A specific 
rule could be created for the tracking CSS, however, this is not a universal solution. 
As HSTS relies on HTTP to HTTPS redirects, a further study was conducted in the 
effectiveness of a plugin called HTTPS Everywhere, made by Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF). The plugin forces sites to be loaded via HTTPS, which could affect 
the way HSTS headers are handled, however, it was quickly found out that the plugin 
relies on a whitelist made by EFF, which again makes this not a universal solution 
(EFF 2018). Nor did the plugin include an option to modify the whitelist. Further 
analysis should be conducted to spoof the list for RGCE demonstrational purposes. 
7.6 Fingerprinting 
For the fingerprinting demonstration, the source code of Fingerprintjs2 was used 
(Vasilyev 2018). This library is commonly used for demonstrations and probably 
some actual user tracking also, as can be deducted from the uBlock Origin default 
filter list containing an entry pointing to this script. The library uses JavaScript and a 
clear enough index page for demonstration purposes, so it was used as is (Figure 35). 
 
Figure 35. Fingerprintjs2 initial results for Firefox 
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The script uses a number of data points provided by the browser, the most important 
being: 
 Browser user agent 
 Language and timezone 
 Resolution, color depth and pixel ratio 
 Plugin information 
 Font information 
 Canvas fingerprinting 
 
Ironically, the script also uses Do Not Track header as one of the tracking elements. 
Testing was conducted differently from other methods, as the purpose of testing was 
not to avoid installation of tracking identifier to the client but to try to minimize the 
footprint seen from the client. All browsers generated a different identifier from 
each other as at least the user agent differed. Results in private browsing were 
different in Firefox and Internet Explorer, as the font information was not passed to 
the script in same way for some reason. Removing site-specific fonts from the 
browser settings resulted in the private browsing having the same fingerprint as in 
normal operation. As canvas fingerprinting relies on rendering, canvas data differed 
also on all browsers. It is hard to tell exactly what the difference was, as the data is 
binary-formatted, however, rendering engine is the main factor in the canvas 
fingerprinting. 
Brave and TorBrowser managed to block some information from leaking to the 
fingerprint, however, Brave needed the option “Block all fingerprinting” to be set on 
instead of the default “Block third-party fingerprinting”, as this was not a third-party 
script. WebGL was blocked altogether and so no canvas fingerprint was generated. 
For Tor Browser, the timezone was seen as UTC and user agent the same as the 
original Firefox 52 ESR, which Tor Browser is based on. Tor Browsers user guide 
dictates that users should keep the window size as original (1000x900 pixels) in order 
to the fingerprint to stay the same. Interestingly, other browsers report the whole 
desktop resolution and not the viewport of the browser. 
Turning plugins on in Firefox did not affect the fingerprint, which is because of 
Firefox preventing the enumeration of the plugins via JavaScript since version 28 
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(bugzilla 2012). Disconnect.me, Ghostery and Forget Me Not proved to be useless 
against fingerprinting, uBlock Origin blocked the resource initially due to 
“fingerprint2.js” being included in the default blocklist. Naming the script file to fp2.js 
instead was enough for the script to work again. NoScript disabled the whole script 
from being run by default. Privacy Badger has the option to block fingerprinting since 
version 1.0 (EFF 2015), but it did not recognize or block the fingerprinting attempt as 
it was seen as a first-party element. Including the fingerprinting code in multiple 
domains (www.*.trk from previous tests) as a third-party component resulted in 
Privacy Badger noticing the tracking element on the third try. 
Lastly, as the Firefox includes an option to resist fingerprinting, it was also tested. 
The option privacy.resistFingerprinting was turned on from about:config and after 
this Firefox warned that the site was using canvas fingerprinting (Figure 36). The 
results also changed radically (Figure 37) 
 
Figure 36. Firefox warns about canvas fingerprinting 
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Figure 37. Fingerprintjs2 results for Firefox with resistFingerprinting on 
 
As can be seen from the results, at least the following data was spoofed: 
 User agent now points to Firefox 52, which is the same as in Tor Browser’s case 
 Resolution now gives the viewport size instead of the display resolution 
 Timezone offset is 0 
 navigator_platform has changed from Win32 -> Win64 
 regular_plugins value is empty 
 canvas fingerprint is different (probably empty if the access request was denied) 
 
This result is almost identical to the Tor Browser’s case, which is no surprise as Tor 
Browser uses the Firefox source code as a base. There is also a project called Tor 
Uplift that aims to implement Tor Browser patches on the mainline Firefox builds, so 
future Tor Browser versions can use newer Firefox source code (Mozilla 2018). 
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7.7 Network-level metadata injection 
As all normal user tracking cases were covered, the focus turned onto network-level 
metadata injection like in the Verizon case (Mayer 2014). As RGCE already has a 
mockup of the Verizon network, a separate subnet was created for “Verizon  
Wireless” clients, which were to be part of this experiment. The topology is shown in 
Figure 38. Header injection was implemented with a Squid Transparent Forward 
Proxy (squid-cache wiki 2018) as the default gateway of the clients combined with a 
Python ICAP server created by Nikolay Ivanov (Ivanov 2017). ICAP stands for Internet 
Content Adaptation Protocol and can be used to rewrite portions of the HTTP 
requests passed to the ICAP server.  
 
Figure 38. Metadata injection in RGCE Verizon Wireless network 
 
The ICAP server was modified to inject the X-VERIZON and X-VERIZON-MAC header 
values into all HTTP requests. The first value was simply set as True and the latter 
one was resolved from the server’s ARP table, which contains the information on IP 
and MAC addresses. The MAC address here simulates a customer identifier, 
however, it could as easily be an IMEI, a DHCP unique identifier or even a customer 
number correlated from the ISP router information or customer database. The 
injected headers can be seen in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39. Injected tracking headers in Verizon network 
 
After confirming that headers were injected correctly, a tracking beacon was created 
similar to the one in the ETag case. This time the PHP code serving the requested 
image reads the X-VERIZON-MAC header value and uses that to log page visits. The 
tracking element can then be included in pages as a Verizon affiliate logo, and it 
should not be caught in any evasion method as no cookie, ETag or any other client-
side tracking element is used. Lastly, an account information page was created 
(Figure 40) so the clients in RGCE Verizon Wireless network can check their logged 
pagevisits. 
 
Figure 40. Account information page 
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7.8 Do Not Track demonstration 
To prove that implementing Do Not Track is not very hard, server-side cookies from 
previous demonstrations were modified. As the DNT is just an HTTP Header value on 
a request, it was very simple to add handling for this header: 
// If DNT is set, do not track 
$req_headers = getallheaders(); 
if (isset($req_headers['DNT'])) { 
 if ($req_headers['DNT'] == 1) { 
  // Set the Tk Header and no response code 
  http_response_code(204); 
  header('Tk: N');   
  die(); 
 } 
} 
// Set Tk header as tracked 
header('Tk: T');   
The code just checks if the “DNT” header value is set to 1, and then gives the result 
as HTTP Response code 204 No Content. Otherwise normal cookie operation 
resumes. Tk-header value is also set like described in W3C Tracking Preference 
Expression guide (W3C 2015). The result can be seen in Figure 41. Similar 
modifications can easily be implemented in any of the tracking elements. 
 
Figure 41. Cookie demo page respects Do Not Track requests 
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8 Results 
8.1 Research results 
The effectiveness of cookie blocking was somewhat inconclusive. First-party cookies 
can be used to skip most of the detection techniques and even though strict enough 
rules will block all cookies, the user is left with bad web experience or the need to 
always whitelist pages when needed. Blocklists cannot be used to block the first 
party cookies at all without breaking the functionality to the first-party site itself. 
Third-party cookies, however, can be blocked effectively with any of the methods, 
however, for example the heuristics in Privacy Badger was a letdown as it requires 
enough entropy on the tracking id. As the entropy is checked against a hard-coded 
list (lowEntropyCookieValues) (Privacy Badger Source Code 2018), it should be 
possible to just divide the user identifier into smaller cookies and bypass this 
heuristic check. In addition, it still needs the cookie to be set as a third-party 
element. Additionally, many web applications, such as Microsoft Teams which is used 
in JAMK University of Applied Sciences, requires third-party cookies in order to 
function at all (Figure 42). 
 
Figure 42. Third-party cookies required for Microsoft Teams 
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ETags, on the other hand, are simple to implement, and mimicking Apache ETag 
values can make them potentially invisible for the user. However, tracking the user 
purely with ETag values is not very robust and requires other methods (cookies, IP 
address) for correlation as hard refresh should always request a new value. Beacons 
can also use raw image data such as in Kamkar’s evercookies (Kamkar 2010), which is 
a more robust way of storing data; however, as was tested, this is not an all-enduring 
solution. Further study should be made to see how forward proxies would handle 
Etags and if tracking could be implemented using various cache-control parameters. 
HSTS Cookies were found to be a robust way of tracking the user, especially when 
using dynamically created CSS files that in turn load resources with HSTS bit set. 
However, as was pointed out in nevkontaktes implementation (HSTS Super Cookie 
2018), it is a slow and very resource-intensive way to implement tracking as it 
requires an own HTTPS session for each bit of entropy. It also requires several 
different subdomains and possibly a wildcard certificate to be implemented. 
In the fingerprinting case, it is almost impossible to verify the entropy of the user’s 
fingerprints or to see how many other users have a similar fingerprint. Sites such as 
EFF’s Panopticlick (EFF 2018b) can be helpful, however, ultimately the tracking 
organisations can use a different approach or alter the fingerprinting method slightly 
to provide different results. TorBrowser’s approach to minimize the browser 
footprint does look promising though. 
Metadata injection at the network level seemed to be the most intrusive, as there is 
almost no way for the user to block this or to see whether it is being done to them. 
Using HTTPS, VPN or TOR would be the only options here as no client-side data is 
retained. This kind of user tracking should anyway always be opt-in, as normal users 
may never even find out that they are being tracked. 
8.2 Implementation results 
All of the tracking methods were all relatively easy to implement even without 
comprehensive programming experience. All tracking methods were collected under 
the domain rgcetrack.com and separate documentation was provided for the 
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assignor. The resulting tracking suite (Topology shown in Appendix 5) can be used for 
further teaching, researching and commercial training by the assignor. 
As for the browser and evasion results, all of the browsers performed surprisingly 
similarly, and the selection of the browser is more dependent on user preference 
than anything else. If maximum privacy were be the goal, Tor Browser is clearly the 
choice, however, the other browsers would be enough for an average user when 
configured correctly. Clearing the history and caches often and using private browse 
sessions provides the easiest way to disable most of the user tracking. I would highly 
recommend following the development of Privacy Badger and the Tor Uplift project 
for future enhancements. 
9 Quality analysis 
Most of the resource material used for this thesis was obviously from the Internet, as 
technical aspects of web tracking can change very quickly. A great deal of the 
information for the methods of tracking and evasion was found by researching the 
source codes, which can be thought of as irrefutable, as the program cannot work in 
any other way. However, some information found on reasons for tracking (Gauss 
2017) or hidden methods (Leonhard 2016) could not be verified even though the 
sources seemed reliable. Plenty of the information found was hearsay, conjecture or 
outright paranoia and was left out of this thesis. A great deal of the information was 
found on blogs and news articles about data breaches or vulnerabilities, such as the 
Verizon incident (Mayer 2014). These were cross-referenced with several other sites 
to verify the claims. Reddit was also a valuable tool to find out other people’s 
opinions on cases as such, although privacy-oriented subreddits can be difficult to 
traverse without absorbing too much paranoia. 
The author found surprisingly little academic research on the subject, most of which 
consisted of already well-established methodologies (such as cookies) or how 
tracking affects humans subconsciously or hidden in the systems (e.g. price 
discrimination). Only a handful of actual research was found on evasion techniques 
and many of the whitepapers were very old related to the modern internet. 
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Some books were used to better understand the motives behind the user tracking 
and data collection, such as Schneier on Security (Schneier 2008) and Data and 
Goliath (Schneier 2015) by Bruce Schneier, which both include many of his blog posts 
used in this thesis as references. Schneier is considered to be one of the highly 
esteemed professionals in both computer security and privacy. One problem with 
Schneier’s work, however, is that he concentrates a great deal on the issues in the 
United States, and many of the issues do not apply here in Europe or in third world 
countries or some, which concern more on the physical level such as air traffic safety. 
The implementation and test methodology are no way perfect, as the writer is not a 
programmer nor a web developer. In many cases, more elegant solutions could have 
been used to make tracking methods more difficult to evade. Some evasion tools 
could also have been modified to implement features more suitable for RGCE and 
demonstration use, yet, they were left for further study. However, the methods 
depicted in this thesis should provide a good compilation on the most common ones 
for tracking and evasion. 
10 Conclusions 
The modern Internet has enabled us to express ourselves in more ways than ever. 
The use of social media is almost considered as a requirement for normal life. Voicing 
of opinions is easier than ever and so is the collection and monitoring of those 
opinions and the individuals behind them. However, one cannot stay private just by 
opting out of social media or by keeping to themselves anymore. By using the 
Internet, we publish a vast set of data about ourselves just by our actions 
themselves. Our browsing habits are recorded and monitored, our purchases can be 
tracked and our actions can be correlated to others, creating a profile or 
categorization for us. This profile or category can be resold and then used by a third 
party for any purpose they want, and the user has no control over it in any way. The 
only way to prevent this is to not use the Internet, however, this is futile as modern 
devices and operating systems track us also using telemetry hidden in their normal 
operations. 
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The evasion methods detailed in this thesis seem unfinished and have outright flaws. 
For example, the heuristic analysis of Privacy Badger was a huge letdown, as it 
required the cookie to be set as third party AND the entropy check is done via a hard-
coded list (lowEntropyCookieValues). Brave seems more of a smoke-and-mirrors 
approach where ads and some third party tracking elements are blocked using 
outsourced lists, combined with hacks that are hastily collected and maintained in a 
not very organised way. 
Clearly, an effort is being made to make browsers handle privacy better, which is 
good for the average user. Cross-Origin Identifier Unlinkability/First Party Isolation 
seems a very robust way to prevent tracking without breaking functionality that 
requires the use of third-party cookies. Firefox currently has this feature 
implemented, however, it is not active yet by default. Brave, Tor Browser and Firefox 
can block fingerprinting, which was once considered to be the ultimate tracking tool. 
The Tor Browser project is a fascinating effort to create an ultimate privacy-oriented 
browser and I like their approach the best, as they try to fix many of the grievances 
at the root of the problem without resorting to whitelisting or filters. Brave’s idea of 
replacing ads with a blockchain-based nanopayments seemed controversial, as 
purely from privacy standpoint the idea of replacing ads with other ads and 
implementing a tracking token to replace other ways of tracking does not seem like a 
benefit for the user, but the browser subsidiaries instead. 
Some of the methods for tracking (such as using CSS and network-level metadata) 
and evasion (Safari hardening, First Party Isolation in Firefox) were implemented just 
in time during writing of this thesis. Several huge privacy incidents were also 
unearthed, such as the data collection from Facebook by Cambridge Analytica 
(Cadwalladr, Graham-Harrison 2018). As GDPR is just stepping into effect, privacy is 
currently a hot topic and both the way of tracking users and evading tracking and 
data collection methods will in no doubt change over the next few years. The biggest 
concern is that ultimately money runs the Internet, and as long as there is no 
collective organisation with vast resources behind privacy implementations, the 
focus will rest on providing more Big Data and user tracking, as it is better business. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Source code for the server-side third party cookie example  
sstrack.php 
<?php 
 
include "../sql_settings.php"; 
 
// Open SQL connection 
 
$conn = new mysqli($sql_host, $sql_user, $sql_pass, $sql_db); 
if ($conn->connect_error) { 
 die("Could not connect to database - ". $conn->connect_error); 
} 
 
// Server-side tracking by PHP cookies 
 
// Set cookie 
if (! isset($_COOKIE["sstrackid"] )) { 
 // Create new id and save to sql 
 $useragent = $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']; 
 $sql = "INSERT INTO user (useragent) VALUES ('$useragent');"; 
 $result = $conn->query($sql); 
 $trackid = $conn->insert_id; 
 // Set both 1st and 3rd party cookie for maximum resilience 
 // 1st party can be used later for the JS example 
 setcookie("sstrackid", $trackid, time() + 
60*60*24*365,"rgcetrack.com"); 
 setcookie("sstrackid", $trackid, time() + 
60*60*24*365,$_SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"]); 
 
 // To demonstrate Privacy badger heuristics, we need more entropy 
 // So create another cookie that has an md5 hash of the value 
 setcookie("sstrackmd5", md5($trackid), time() 
+60*60*24*365,"rgcetrack.com"); 
 setcookie("sstrackmd5", md5($trackid), time() 
+60*60*24*365,$_SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"]); 
 
} else { 
 $trackid = $_COOKIE['sstrackid']; 
} 
 
$ip = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']; 
$referer = $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']; 
 
date_default_timezone_set('UTC'); 
$phptime = new DateTime("now"); 
$phptime->setTimezone(new DateTimeZone('UTC')); 
$mysqldate = $phptime->format('Y-m-d H:i:s'); 
 
// Then add the pagevisit to seen 
$sql = "INSERT INTO seen (uid,timestamp,ipaddress,referer) VALUES 
($trackid,'$mysqldate','$ip','$referer');"; 
$result = $conn->query($sql); 
 
$conn->close(); 
 
?> 
Inclusion of the script as a non-visible image in a page: 
<img src="sstrack.php" style="display: none;"> 
SQL clauses for the tracking database: 
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drop table if exists seen; 
drop table if exists user; 
 
create table user (id int not null auto_increment primary key, useragent 
varchar(255)); 
create table seen (id int not null auto_increment primary key, uid int null, 
timestamp datetime, ipaddress varchar(32), referer varchar(255), 
 foreign key (uid) references user(id)); 
 
Appendix 2. Source code for the tracking beacon  
pixel.gif: (Apache should have AddType application/x-httpd-php .gif in order to run 
the PHP code when this “image” is requested) 
<?php 
 
include "../sql_settings.php"; 
 
// Open SQL connection 
 
$conn = new mysqli($sql_host, $sql_user, $sql_pass, $sql_db); 
if ($conn->connect_error) { 
 die("Could not connect to database - ". $conn->connect_error); 
} 
 
// Tracking via ETag or sessions 
 
// Start the session using cache_limiter - Disables pragma: no-cache which 
will break the ETag 
session_cache_limiter('private_no_expire:'); 
session_start(); 
if (isset($_SESSION['trackid'])) { 
 $trackid = $_SESSION['trackid']; 
} 
 
// Old visits should have the trackid set in the ETag (HTTP_IF_NONE_MATCH set 
in the request headers) 
if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_IF_NONE_MATCH'])) { 
 $trackid = $_SERVER['HTTP_IF_NONE_MATCH']; 
} else { 
 // Check the session data first to avoid duplicates on 
Ctrl+Shift+R 
 if (!isset($trackid)) { 
  $useragent = $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']; 
  // Create new id and save to sql 
  $sql = "INSERT INTO user (useragent) VALUES 
('$useragent');"; 
  $result = $conn->query($sql); 
  // Set the Etag to include the id - very crude but 
good for demos 
  $trackid = $conn->insert_id; 
 } 
 // Otherwise the trackid is already set in the session - no 
further action required 
} 
 
$ip = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']; 
$referer = $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']; 
 
date_default_timezone_set('UTC'); 
$phptime = new DateTime("now"); 
$phptime->setTimezone(new DateTimeZone('UTC')); 
$mysqldate = $phptime->format('Y-m-d H:i:s'); 
 
// Then add the pagevisit to seen 
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$sql = "INSERT INTO seen (uid,timestamp,ipaddress,referer,method) VALUES 
($trackid,'$mysqldate','$ip','$referer','ETAG_PIXEL');"; 
$result = $conn->query($sql); 
 
$conn->close(); 
 
// Finally, return the ETag and the real pixel image 
//echo $trackid; 
//header('Etag: "' . $trackid . '"'); 
//header('Etag: ' . $_SESSION['trackid'] ); 
$_SESSION['trackid'] = $trackid; 
header('Etag: ' . $trackid ); 
//if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_IF_NONE_MATCH']) && ($_SESSION['trackid'] == 
$_SERVER['HTTP_IF_NONE_MATCH'])) { 
if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_IF_NONE_MATCH']) && ($trackid == 
$_SERVER['HTTP_IF_NONE_MATCH'])) { 
 http_response_code(304); 
} else { 
 header("Content-Type: image/gif"); 
 echo file_get_contents("realpixel.gif"); 
} 
 
 
?> 
Appendix 3. Index page for the evercookie demonstration page 
<script type="text/javascript" src="js/swfobject-2.2.min.js"></script> 
<script type="text/javascript" src="js/dtjava.js"></script> 
<script type="text/javascript" src="js/evercookie.js"></script> 
 
<body> 
<h3>RGCETrack.com - Evercookie</h3> 
 
<p>Current Cookie value: </p><p id="cookieval">Please wait...</p> 
<p id="description"></p> 
 
<script> 
 
// callback function for the ec.get 
function checkCookie(best_candidate, all_candidates) { 
 var best_candidate; 
 // Since the script seems to run asynchronously, change the HTML 
in a page p-element instead of a variable 
 //document.getElementById("cookieval").innerHTML = value; 
 if (!(best_candidate == "ever!")) { 
  ec.set("trackid", "ever!"); 
  document.getElementById("cookieval").innerHTML = 
"ever! (Just set)"; 
  document.getElementById("description").innerHTML = "A 
new cookie has been set. Please refresh the page to see results."; 
 } else { 
  // Show stuff 
  document.getElementById("cookieval").innerHTML = 
best_candidate; 
  for (var item in all_candidates) 
  
 document.getElementById("description").innerHTML += "Storage 
mechanism " + item +  
    " returned: " + 
all_candidates[item] + "<br/>\n"; 
 }; 
 
} 
 
// Return all possible storages 
function getCookie(best_candidate, all_candidates) 
{ 
 alert("The retrieved cookie is: " + best_candidate + "\n"+ 
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  "all_candidates object has been iterated and will be 
shown next in the page, explaining all possible storage types."); 
 
} 
 
// IndexedDB breaks something? 
// Also something causes a loop? 
var ec = new evercookie({ 
     baseurl: '/evercookie', 
     asseturi: '/assets', 
     phpuri: '/php', 
 java: false 
// idb: true, 
// hsts: true, 
// db: true, 
// silverlight: false, 
// lso: false, 
// java: false, 
// history: true 
  
  
 
 /* Options */ 
}); 
 
// Check the cookie and act accordingly 
ec.get("trackid", checkCookie); 
 
</script> 
 
<button onClick='ec.set("trackid","undefined")'>Remove cookie</button> 
 
</body> 
Appendix 4. HSTS Server-side source code 
setup.css: (Similar to Appendix 2, Apache should have AddType application/x-httpd-
php .css in order to run the PHP code when this “image” is requested. Also, as seen in 
the code, Content-type headers need to be set to text/css) 
 
<?php 
 
// Spoof header, disable caching 
header("Content-type: text/css"); 
header("Cache-control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0"); 
header("Cache-control: post-check=0, pre-check=0", false); 
header("Pragma: no-cache"); 
 
$bitlength= 8; 
 
// This script generates the ID for a new visitor 
 
include "../sql_settings.php"; 
 
// Open SQL connection 
 
$conn = new mysqli($sql_host, $sql_user, $sql_pass, $sql_db); 
if ($conn->connect_error) { 
 die("Could not connect to database - ". $conn->connect_error); 
} 
 
// Check if the request was HTTPS 
if (isset($_SERVER["HTTPS"]) || $_SERVER["SERVER_PORT"] == 443 ) { 
 
 // Return a HSTS header - Forces subsequent visits to be HTTPS 
 header('Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000'); 
 
 // We have already been here, generate a token and request 
88 
 
 
 $token = uniqid(); 
 for ($i = 0; $i <$bitlength; $i++)  
 { 
  // Print the corresponding bit as include definition 
  echo "@import 
url(\"http://$i.hsts.trk/display.css?token=$token\") all;\n"; 
 } 
 //echo "@import \"test.css\" all;\n"; 
 
} else { 
 // We have not been here, create cookie content 
 
 // Generate new ID 
 $useragent = $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']; 
 // Create new id and save to sql 
 $sql = "INSERT INTO user (useragent) VALUES ('$useragent');"; 
 $result = $conn->query($sql); 
 // Set the trackid to include the last id - very crude but good 
for demos 
 $trackid = $conn->insert_id; 
 
 $conn->close(); 
 
 // Split the ID down to bits 
 $bits = decbin($trackid); 
 $bits = str_pad ($bits, $bitlength, "0", STR_PAD_LEFT); 
 for ($i = 0; $i < strlen($bits); $i++)  
 { 
  // Print the corresponding bit as include definition 
  $r=$bits[strlen($bits)-$i-1]; 
  echo "@import url(\"https://$i.hsts.trk/$r.css\") 
all;\n"; 
 } 
 
 // Import ourselves again 
 echo "@import \"https://css.hsts.trk/setup.css\" all;\n"; 
 
 
} 
 
?> 
display.css: 
<?php 
 
header("Content-type: text/css"); 
 
$bitlength= 8; 
 
// This script generates some css formatting for demonstration 
// It also logs token requests to SQL 
 
// Check what our bit sequence is 
$domain = explode(".",$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']); 
$bit = $domain[0]; 
$token = $_GET['token']; 
 
// Fore testing: 
//$bit="7"; 
//$token="asdf"; 
 
// Check if we were requested via HTTP or HTTPS 
 
// Check if the request was HTTPS 
if (isset($_SERVER["HTTPS"]) || $_SERVER["SERVER_PORT"] == 443 ) { 
 
 echo ".b$bit::after{display:inline;content:'1';}"; 
 $setbit = 1; 
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} else { 
 
 echo ".b$bit::after { \n display: inline; \n content: '0'; \n 
}\n"; 
 $setbit=0; 
  
} 
echo "\n.token::after { \n display: inline; \n content: '$token'; \n }\n"; 
 
// Log the request to hsts_tokens 
include "../sql_settings.php"; 
 
// Open SQL connection 
 
$conn = new mysqli($sql_host, $sql_user, $sql_pass, $sql_db); 
if ($conn->connect_error) { 
 die("Could not connect to database - ". $conn->connect_error); 
} 
 
$sql = "INSERT INTO hsts_token (token,bit$bit) VALUES ('$token',$setbit) ON 
DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE bit$bit=$setbit;"; 
$result = $conn->query($sql); 
 
// Find out if we have all bits set 
$sql = "SELECT * FROM hsts_token WHERE "; 
for ($i = 0; $i <$bitlength; $i++)  
{ 
 $sql = $sql . "bit$i IS NOT NULL AND "; 
} 
$sql = $sql . "token='$token';"; 
$result = $conn->query($sql); 
 
if ($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) { 
 // We have all bits, get bitmask 
 $bits=str_pad("",$bitlength," "); 
 for ($i = 0; $i <$bitlength; $i++)  
 { 
  $bits = substr_replace($bits, $row["bit$i"], 
$bitlength-$i, 1); 
  //$bits[$bitlength-$i-1] = $row["bit$i"]; 
 } 
 $trackid = bindec($bits); 
 echo "\n.trackid::after { \n display: inline; \n content: 
'$trackid'; \n }\n"; 
 
 $ip = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']; 
 $referer = $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']; 
 
 date_default_timezone_set('UTC'); 
 $phptime = new DateTime("now"); 
 $phptime->setTimezone(new DateTimeZone('UTC')); 
 $mysqldate = $phptime->format('Y-m-d H:i:s'); 
 
 
 // Then add the pagevisit to seen 
 $sql3 = "INSERT INTO seen 
(uid,timestamp,ipaddress,referer,method) VALUES 
($trackid,'$mysqldate','$ip','$referer','HSTS_TOKEN:$token');"; 
 $result = $conn->query($sql3); 
 
} 
 
// Set the trackid to include the last id - very crude but good for demos 
$trackid = $conn->insert_id; 
 
$conn->close(); 
 
?> 
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Appendix 5. Topology for the RGCETrack demonstrational suite 
 
